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Abstract
We describe two studies into ways in which
human mathematicians use mathematical ex-
amples in their research. In the first study
we bring together theoretical and empirical ap-
proaches to studying ways in which examples
are used in mathematical research, concluding
that examples are used for conjecture inven-
tion, understanding, plausibility-testing, dis-
proof and modification. Where possible we
describe corresponding efforts in automating
these aspects of reasoning. In our second study
we present an investigation based on grounded
theory into example-use during an online math-
ematical conversation. These studies suggest
ways in which “human-like” example-use in
mathematics could be further automated.
1 Introduction
At an event that we organised a few years ago [1], lead-
ing mathematicians flagged the importance of collabo-
rative systems that “think like a mathematician”, han-
dle unstructured approaches such as the use of “sloppy”
natural language and the exchange of informal knowl-
edge and intuition not recorded in papers, and engage
diverse researchers in creative problem solving. This
accords with work of cognitive scientists, sociologists,
philosophers and the narrative accounts of mathemati-
cians themselves, which highlight the paradoxical nature
of mathematical practice — while the goal of mathemat-
ics is to discover mathematical truths justified by rig-
orous argument, mathematical discovery involves “soft”
aspects such as creativity, informal argument, error and
analogy.
We followed the above event with an empirical study of
what mathematicians talk about [22], and found that ex-
amples form the biggest single category. These may be
examples of a concept, such as the set of natural num-
bers being an example of a group, and the numbers 3, 4,
and 5 an example of a Pythagorean triple, or support-
ing or counterexamples to a conjecture, such as 2 and
3 being supporting examples of the conjecture that all
integers have an even number of divisors, and 4 being
a counterexample. The study found that examples are
used for different reasons at different points in a con-
versation, for instance to understand a conjecture, to
test it, or extend it. For instance, consider the following
conversation, taken from an online forum for solving a
conjecture [3]:
“If the points form a convex polygon, it is easy.”
[Anonymous July 19, 2011 @ 8:08 pm]
“Yes. Can we do it if there is a single point not
on the convex hull of the points?” [Thomas H
July 19, 2011 @ 8:09 pm]
“Say there are four points: an equilateral tri-
angle, and then one point in the center of the
triangle. No three points are collinear. It seems
to me that the windmill can not use the cen-
ter point more than once! As soon as it hits
one of the corner points, it will cycle indefi-
nitely through the corners and never return to
the center point. I must be missing something
here...” [Jerzy July 19, 2011 @ 8:17 pm]
“This isn’t true it will alternate between the
centre and each vertex of the triangle.” [Joe
July 19, 2011 @ 8:21 pm]
Here we see people raising simple examples to under-
stand a conjecture, and proposing and discussing other
examples in order to explore and test the conjecture.
In this paper we bring together work on example-use in
mathematics research and relate it to automated rea-
soning. In the first study we consider a course-grained
empirical study (§2.1) and review theoretical ideas on
example-use (§2.2), describing resulting roles for exam-
ples and corresponding automated systems (§2.3). In the
second we conduct a fine-grained analysis of a mathemat-
ical research conversation (§3) and show the importance
of context, language and social pleasantries for talking
about different kinds of example. We conclude by con-
sidering next steps in building collaborative systems for
contributing examples in mathematical research (§4).
1.1 Motivation
The simulation of mathematical reasoning has been a
driving force throughout the history of Artificial In-
telligence research, yet despite significant successes (eg
[10; 9; 13]) it has not achieved widespread adoption by
mathematicians. An oft-cited reason for this is that cur-
rent systems cannot do mathematics in the way that
humans do: machine proofs are thought to be unclear,
uninspiring and untrustworthy, as opposed to human
proofs which can be deep, elegant and explanatory. Tra-
ditionally there have been two barriers to developing sys-
tems which produce “human-like” mathematics: firstly,
it is difficult to know what this is; and secondly, it is
difficult to automate [6; 12]. Recent developments in
online collaborative mathematics, such as the Polymath
and MathOverflow projects [4; 5] provide a remarkable
opportunity for overcoming the first barrier: by provid-
ing a working record of the backstage of mathematics,
complete with mistakes, deadends and unfinished work,
these constitute a rich evidence base for understanding
live mathematical practice. At the same time, we be-
lieve that we can start to overcome the second barrier
by focusing in on a specific and particularly prominent
aspect of mathematical practice – example-use in math-
ematics. This will allow us to (a) build on the increas-
ing sophistication of model generators in automated rea-
soning, and (b) formulate constrained, measurable and
achievable goals for automated “human-like” example-
use in mathematics.
2 Study 1: Theories of example-use in
mathematical research
2.1 An empirical study
The mathematical community have developed systems
for “crowdsourcing” (albeit among a highly specialised
crowd) the production of mathematics through collab-
oration and sharing [20]. The Polymath and MiniPoly-
math collaborative proofs, a new idea led by Gowers and
Tao, are of particular interest to us: these use a blog
and wiki for collaboration among mathematicians from
different backgrounds and have led to major advances
[11]. Also of interest are discussion fora which allow
rapid informal interaction and problem solving; in seven
years the community question answering system for re-
search mathematicians MathOverflow has around 70,000
users and has hosted over 90,000 conversations. These
systems provide substantial and unprecedented evidence
for studying mathematical practice, allowing the aug-
mentation of traditional ethnography with a variety of
empirical techniques for analysing the texts and network
structures of the interactions.
In an ethnographic analysis of such a record [23], we clas-
sified each conversation turn as relating to different as-
pects of mathematical activity and found that the largest
single category was examples. Here we mean examples of
concepts or conjectures: mathematical objects, such as
specific numbers, graphs or groups, which have particu-
lar properties. For instance, the number 2 is an example
of the concept prime number, a supporting example of
the fundamental theorem of arithmetic, and a counterex-
ample to the conjecture that all primes are odd. Exam-
ples were used for different purposes at different stages of
the discussion. One of the first comments was a simple
supporting example of the conjecture – the only example
explicitly raised in this context. Other supporting ex-
amples were raised as elaboration or as highlighting the
necessity of a condition in order to explore the condition.
One comment contained an argument as to why a par-
ticular example could not exist. Some examples – both
support and counterexamples – were raised as clarifica-
tion. 83% of the comments we categorised as concerning
examples were about counterexamples (or examples of
undetermined status).
In a study of a sample mathoverflow conversations we
found that in a third of the responses explicit exam-
ples were given, as evidence for, or counterexamples to,
conjectures. Requests for examples of a phenomenon
or an object with particular properties also featured in
our breakdown of questions as one of three predominant
kinds [16]. These analyses suggest that examples play a
fundamental role in mathematical collaboration – a con-
servative estimate puts it at a third of all mathematical
conversations that we analysed.
2.2 Theoretical work
The small amount of theoretical work on the use of ex-
amples in mathematical research – itself based on real-
world case studies – supports our findings. Polya wrote
extensively about the value of examples in conjecture
generation and testing [24], while Lakatos followed up
Polya’s ideas with a demonstration of the role that coun-
terexamples play, driving negotiation and development
of concepts, conjectures and proofs [15].
In his “Induction in solid geometry” [25, Part III, pp
35- ] Polya details how examples are invoked at differ-
ent points to suggest, evaluate, develop and prove the
Descartes-Euler conjecture that for any polyhedra, the
number of vertices (V) minus the number of edges (E)
plus the number of faces (F) is equal to 2. He starts
with simple examples of polyhedra to find regularities
and formulating initial conjectures. Once a conjecture
has been found, plausibility testing is performed with
examples getting gradually more complex, looking for
examples which support rather than refute the conjec-
ture. If it stands up to these then more severe exam-
ples are looked for - with the focus going from find-
ing supporting examples to looking for counterexamples,
leading to “very difficult” cases. If a conjecture sur-
vives this test, then a proof is sought. Lakatos takes
over at the this point, describing a rational reconstruc-
tion in which counterexamples drive conjecture and con-
cept change and are used to strengthen a proof via var-
ious responses. These include three main methods of
theorem formation – all triggered by counterexamples:
monster-barring (concerned with concept development);
exception-barring (concerned with conjecture develop-
ment), and the method of proofs and refutations (con-
cerned with proof development).
2.3 Examples in Automated Reasoning
Example, or model, generation is one of the successes
of formal verification, interactive theorem proving, and
automated reasoning, with substantial research under-
lying these achievements. Techniques underlying such
systems include methods based on first order reasoning,
constraint satisfaction, and propositional logic: see [27]
for an overview.
We summarise our empirical studies in §2.1 and theo-
retical work presented in §2.2 as using examples for the
following purposes: (i) conjecture invention; (ii) under-
standing a conjecture; (iii) plausibility-testing; (iv) dis-
proving or modifying a conjecture. Simulations of (i)
and (iv) can found in automated reasoning: to the best
of our knowledge there is little or no automated work
on (ii) or (iii). The first purpose is scientific induc-
tion, which underlies the machine learning paradigm.
Colton’s theory formation system HR [7] also uses ex-
amples, or objects of interest (such as specific groups
or numbers), to drive theory development. The sys-
tem uses production rules to form new concepts from
old ones; measures of interestingness to drive a heuristic
search; empirical pattern-based conjecture making tech-
niques to find relationships between concepts, and third
party logic systems such as the Otter theorem prover[19],
the Mace model generator[17]. Otter is a first order res-
olution theorem prover which has been used for many
discovery tasks in algebraic domains, e.g., [18]. Mace
is a model generator which employs the Davis-Putnam
method for generating models to first order sentences.
The IsaCosy system by Johansson et al. is another in-
stances of example-driven theory formation software [14]
which performs inductive theory formation by synthe-
sising conjectures from the available constants and free
variables.
Along with colleagues, Pease has developed two soft-
ware systems based on the fourth purpose above.
The Theorem Modifier system (TM) [8] uses Lakatos’s
exception-barring methods to provide a flexible auto-
mated theorem-proving system. This is able to take in
a conjecture, try to prove it and if unsuccessful (either
because the conjecture is too hard to prove or because it
is false), use supporting or counter-examples to produce
modified versions of the conjecture which it can prove.
For instance, given the non-theorem that all groups are
Abelian, TM states that it cannot prove the original re-
sult, but it has discovered that all self-inverse groups are
Abelian. The HRL system [21] is a computational rep-
resentation of Lakatos’s theory, in which all of his main
methods for theory development are implemented. In
keeping with the dialectical aspect described by Lakatos,
HRL is implemented in an agent architecture. Each
agent has a copy of the HR system, and starts with a dif-
ferent database of examples to work with, and different
interestingness measures. Agents send conjectures, con-
cepts, counterexamples, or requests to a central agent,
who choreographs a discussion, using the example-based
methods prescribed by Lakatos to modify faulty conjec-
tures.
3 Study 2: A fine-grained study of
example-use in mathematics research
3.1 Source material
To apply empirical methods to the study of mathe-
matical explanation we looked for a suitable source of
data which, ideally, would capture the live production of
mathematics rather than the finished outcome in text-
book or journal paper; would exhibit examples in prac-
tice through capturing mathematical collaboration; and
could be argued to represent the activities of a reasonable
subset of the mathematical community. The dataset we
chose was the first Mini-Polymath project, in 2009, an
online collaboration on a blog to solve problems drawn
from International Mathematical Olympiads.
The first Mini-Polymath project started on July 20th,
2009 @ 6:02 am and ended August 15th, 2010 @ 3:30
pm. The problem statement came from Problem 6 of
the Math Olympiad that year:
Let a1, a2, . . . , an be distinct positive integers
and let M be a set of n−1 positive integers not
containing s = a1+a2+. . .+an. A grasshopper
is to jump along the real axis, starting at the
point 0 and making n jumps to the right with
lengths a1, a2, . . . , an in some order. Prove that
the order can be chosen in such a way that the
grasshopper never lands on any point in M .
The solution was found on 21st July, 2009@ 11:16 am af-
ter 201 comments. The total conversation contained 356
comments and 32,430 words, and there were between
81 and 100 participants (some participants were anony-
mous). We analysed the first 160 comments, which is
80% of the conversation leading up to the solution.1
3.2 Method
We used an approach based on grounded theory [26]
to conduct a fine-grained study. This is a data-driven
method to systematically build integrated sets of con-
cepts in a topic where little is known. Researchers keep
an open mind in order to build a theory which is purely
1The reason for 80% rather than the full 100% was purely
pragmatic: such close analysis is extremely time-consuming
to perform and it was felt that results were sufficiently robust
after 80%.
grounded in data rather than influenced by prior work.
As is the standard in grounded theory, we followed four
stages:
1. Open coding: Use the raw data to suggest code def-
initions (anchors that help to identify key points in
the data).
2. Axial coding: Development of concepts by combin-
ing codes into collections of similar content.
3. Selective coding: Grouping the concepts into cate-
gories - put the data back together by making con-
nections across codes, categories, and concepts.
4. Theory building: Compare the central phenomenon
across several dimensions, and formulate the major
themes which have emerged.
Here codes, concepts and categories are different levels
of abstraction and are the building blocks for a grounded
theory.
We used a software tool for grounded theory and mixed
methods research, dedoose [2], shown in Figure 1. Here
we see the codification of a comment. It can be seen
that we sometimes applied multiple codes within a single
comment, or sentence; even applying overlapping codes
if appropriate. In this example for instance, the words
“ugle”, “elusive” and “hope” (which occurs twice) are
coded as emotion or value words, which has been cate-
gorised under language.
The coding was mainly done by the first author, who has
a first degree in Mathematics, a PhD in a related disci-
pline and more than 10 years experience studying math-
ematical reasoning. Her analysis was discussed at length
and during different stages of analysis with the second
author, who has a PhD in Mathematics and over 10
years experience as a professional research mathemati-
cian. Any differences of opinion were resolved, allowing
us to align our ideas.
3.3 Findings
In order to build a substantive theory of example-use
in mathematical research, we followed the stages of
grounded theory as described below.
Open coding
In the first stage, we identified and coded code definitions
of interest via open coding. In the example below, a
participant gives a local conjecture about the shortest
route and points out a problem example straightaway.
This comment excerpt is coded as “Counterexample to
a local conjecture”
I had hoped that the shortest would always
be (mk,mk+1), but this doesn’t seem to be
true: consider A = (9, 10, 11, 30) and M =
(11, 30, 49).
The open coding process created a total of 98 loosely
connected codes and descriptions. Since we coded the
conversation into any appropriate size chunk of data and
allowed multiple codings, we could get more code appli-
cations than number of comments: in fact we got signif-
icantly more, with 646 applications of the codes across
our 160 comments.
Axial coding
In the second stage, we identified interrelationships be-
tween our codes and formed concepts by combining
codes, to describe repeated patterns of interactions and
problem solving strategies in the conversation. We found
23 concepts, including examples, and also error, expla-
nation, question, re-representation, references to other
mathematics, metaphors and requests for help (we show
interrelationships for our examples category in Figure 2).
Selective coding/Theory building
In the third and fourth stages, we grouped concepts into
categories, making connections across codes, categories,
and concepts. The following main categories emerged:
context (often a mathematical object such as a conjec-
ture or a concept), the language used (for instance, emo-
tive or values language, or metaphors), and the social
pleasantries needed to keep the conversation flowing (for
instance, thanking a participant for their contribution or
introducing a new comment in a very humble way).
We show a visual representation of how these categories
relate to each other and to different kinds of examples
in Figure 3.
Context:
Hypothesized cases to explore a conjecture were very
common, and these arose in the context of introduc-
ing notation, re-representation, meta-comments about
proof, explanation, justification, induction and using
them to asking questions. Simple supporting examples
were used to explore a conjecture.
Counterexamples were largely used in the context of
explanation, asking questions and proof development,
including induction, case splits and constructive argu-
ments. They were also used in the context of errors
being pointed out.
Examples were also suggested as useful cases, rather
than directly supporting or refuting a given conjecture.
For instance, worst case scenarios were brought up in the
context of proof strategies.
There were no examples found being used in the context
of rhetorical questions or requests for help, and very few
in the context of directly considering the plausibility of
a conjecture.
Figure 1: Example showing the codification of a comment using dedoose [2]
Figure 2: Interrelationships identified in Stages 2 and 3 between codes relevant to our examples category, where arcs
represent subset relationships.
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Figure 3: A diagrammatic model of our findings, showing the three central themes that emerged and how they were
exhibited. Specific types of example in each case are shown in italics.
Language:
Value words were used describing some examples, for
instance, examples were described as degenerate or as
particularly useful (value words) in a given context. The
quote below discusses an example, breaking it down into
various scenarios and using them to discuss proof strat-
egy and in particular when induction was “a bit of a
sledgehammer” (metaphor), and when it was “more ap-
propriate” (each time showing why). Emotive words
such as “cheating” are used in a lighthearted way:
Let’s take ai = i for i = 1, 2, 3, 4. So we’re
trying to get to 10 in steps of 1,2,3,4 and there
are three landmines.
If there’s a landmine on any of 1,2,3,4, then by
47 (@liuxiaochuan) they must be on 4, or 4 and
3, o r 4 and 3 and 2. In the third case we can
go to 1 and then to 5, and then were done by
induction (two steps and zero obstacles, so per-
haps induction was a bit of a sledgehammer).
If there are obstacles on 4 and 3, then induction
is more appropriate – we can either get to 5 in
two steps and are then done, or theres an ob-
stacle at 5, in which case we can go 2,6,7,10. If
theres just an obstacle at 4, things get harder,
since then we need to know what goes on after
4. But then we can cheat and say that at least
one number between 6 and 9 is an obstacle so
we can run things in reverse. The only case not
covered is then when the obstacles are at 4,5,6.
Social pleasantries:
When people were discussing a hypothesized case to ex-
plore, they frequently referred to a previous comment –
either by number, by the content, or using the name of
the participant who had said it.
Humble language was used occasionally when exploring
a simple case which supports a sub-conjecture: “(I may
make mistakes here.)”
4 Further work and conclusions
The new records of mathematical reasoning, our ethno-
graphic studies highlighting the importance of the ex-
ample in such reasoning, alongside the development of
sophisticated model generation systems, mean that we
are now in a position to build on our insight into the use
of examples in mathematics and extend it in a compu-
tational way. We plan to automate those roles (ii) and
(iii) for which we found no corresponding system in §2,
and to build on results from §3 to guide us in construct-
ing a system which can useful contribute examples to a
mathematics research conversation.
Building a system which can do even a limited aspect of
“human-like” mathematics will open the way for a new
form of mixed-initiative, collaborative reasoning between
human and software participants in interactions which
are both naturalistic but formally constrained and well-
defined. This has the potential to impact both the pro-
fessional practice and pedagogy of mathematics.
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